CONFUSE and CONTROL

SOVIET TECHNIQUES IN GERMANY

Indexed

CONFUSE and CONTROL

SOVIET TECHNIQUES IN GERMANY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 4107

EUROPEAN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SERIES 17 · RELEASED APRIL 1951

DIVISION OF PUBLICATIONS · OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price 30 cents

1814 2-51

GERMANY: Zones of Occupation

0 50 100 Miles

CONTENTS

	Page
THE IMPORTANCE OF GERMANY	1
THE TWO GERMANYS	10
THE WHITSUNTIDE MARCH	18
THE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN WESTERN GERMANY	25
THE PARTY LINE	43
COMMUNIST LITERATURE	57
COMMUNIST RIOTS	68
THE ELECTION OF OCTOBER 15, 1950	76
PRAGUE CONFERENCE AND PEACE LAW	84
BUILDING STRENGTH AGAINST COMMUNISM	89

GREATER BERLIN
Sectors of Occupation
0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles
FRENCH
TEGELER SEE
SOVIET
BRITISH
AMERICAN
GROSSER MÜGGEL SEE

11815 2-51

THE IMPORTANCE OF GERMANY

HITLER'S Germany has been destroyed. Its government was completely wiped out. Most of its factories, houses, and transportation were destroyed or damaged, and its people crushed, humiliated, and brought under military government by hostile armies from East and West. But the land of Germany is still there, an almost open road between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. The German people are still there, in a condition of military helplessness and mental uncertainty.

The Germans, of course, are not all alike. Germany includes people who might once more lead the nation in a revolt against civilization, if they should get the power. Germany includes people who would again strike an alliance with Russia in the belief that they have the genius and organizing ability to make Russia their tool. Germany also includes people who long to see their country a respected and equal member of Western civilization.

Germany is important because of its natural resources and the productive skill of its people. Historically the science and technology of Germany have always been closely interwoven with those of the other Western nations. These resources are a necessary

part of any plan for a united Europe that can support itself without constant subsidy from the United States. So long as distress in Europe opens the way for communist infiltration, economic recovery is a matter of life and death. Even without the fear of communism, the prosperity of Europe is a necessary element in world prosperity. In any sound economic system for Europe, Germany must be included.

Germany is equally important to the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could control and organize Western Germany as a satellite, they would have a productive power so formidable as to make our position critical. At present, the Soviets hold the bulk of the land of the European-Asian continent, with unlimited masses of low-cost manpower. But their industrial power is weak, and their scientific and technical manpower, though good, is scanty. Adding Germany would balance the Soviet strength and bring the Soviet dream of world conquest close to a sure gamble.

THE CHANGE IN OCCUPATION POLICIES

The policy of the Western Powers has changed since the surrender of Germany in 1945. At first the Allies, including Russia, agreed that the menace of German power must be destroyed and Germany must be made helpless and kept helpless. Then it became clear that the Soviets had taken over the position of Public Enemy. The Western Powers have shifted

Crack troops of East German militarized police parade in East Berlin.

away from a policy of destroying the strength of Germany. Now we are trying to bring Germany into the society of free nations as an equal and no longer aggressive member.

The Soviets, in the meantime, have reduced their zone to a satellite state by the use of intrigue and force, backed by the Red Army but acting through a native police on the Nazi model. They have not made the majority of East Germans into Communists or friends of the Soviet Union, but they have brought them under control. The Soviets have attacked the West Germans

Soviet propaganda calls the airlift the beginning of a new war.

with all the force of communist propaganda in order to frustrate the policies of the Western Powers.

SOVIET ACTION AIMED AT CHAOS

Soviet propaganda cannot hope to persuade a majority of any free people to favor the Soviets. No nation is known to have ever had a communist majority. The propaganda, therefore, cannot be understood if it is merely examined to see whether it is consistent, or truthful, or sensible. The fact that it can easily be proved to be contradictory, full of lies, and illogical does not justify looking at it with contempt. The Soviet propaganda makers know their job well. They may be able to persuade only a few people who are ripe for conversion to the communist religion. They do not have to convert the majority. Their main purpose is to confuse the majority with contradictory stories that will be repeated here and there until people do not know where the truth is. They aim to start lies that will discourage those who hope for a free world, that will poison the trust between friendly nations, and stir up hatred between races and classes. Communism is a disease; it does not have to make sense to be successful as a disease.

Communist language, at first sight, is confusing largely because most things are named for their opposites. What we call a "police state," for instance, is called in communist language a "people's democracy." Socialist Unity is the name of the Communist

East German pamphlet: "Our Soviet friends send tractors for German fields."

Party of the Soviet zone of Germany, although the Socialist parties in the free nations of Western Europe, and in Western Germany, are bitter enemies of the Communists. The confusion of language is not accidental. Communists aim to cause confusion.

SOVIET PURPOSES

In Berlin on July 20–24, 1950, the Socialist Unity Party held its third annual convention in East Berlin. It called for stepping up the arming of Eastern Germany, using the following language: "A struggle is to be waged against pacifism which disarms the followers of peace. . . . The masses of the people are to be told in untiring enlightenment campaigns that war can be prevented if the camp of peace will courageously fight for peace . . . in the event of aggression it will be the duty of the German people to fight the aggressors and support the Soviet Union in restoring peace." The convention also announced that the Communists would step up the infiltration of Western Germany: "The convention holds the view that a serious change must take place in the direction of increased concentration of forces for the spreading of the National Front of the democratic Germany in West Berlin and in Western Germany. . . . The next task of the National Front will be to launch within the separate state of Bonn a national resistance against the colonial splitting and war policies of the Anglo-American imperialism and its German stool-pigeons."

(The "State of Bonn" refers to Western Germany.)

One of the advantages of this kind of communist gobbledygook is that to Western eyes it looks so fantastically insincere that we are in danger of taking too simple a view of its meaning. It can be translated simply: "The Kremlin proposes to train East German

"White Is Black. Black Is White. Night Is Day—"

communist forces; meanwhile Western Germany is to be softened up." Eastern Germany is called the "Camp of Peace" regardless of the fact that it is the camp of preparation for a possible aggressive war. Those who know the facts are not confused. But millions of people on both sides of the Iron Curtain have only a sketchy knowledge of the facts, and some of them can be confused by constant repetition of the communist line.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that, however cynical the masters of the Kremlin may be, the lower levels of the Communist Party contain many sincere believers who swallow the whole line. The gobbledygook is essential to satisfy the rank-and-file communist workers who really believe in their cause. All the history of communist countries from Russia to Czechoslovakia proves that it is not necessary for the mass of the people to be persuaded. If only the 5 percent who accept the communist religion are sincerely fanatical, the leaders can use them to control the whole country and make it an instrument of Soviet power. A purely gangster organization out for plunder alone would be far less dangerous than what we have here—a fighting religion controlled by gangsters at the top.

This pamphlet is designed to give American readers an outline of the communist operations in Germany, and of the means the Western Powers and the democratic Germans are able to use for resisting communist pressure.

CONFLICTING IDEAS OF OCCUPYING POWERS

ALL Germans want to see Germany united. All the Occupying Powers want to see Germany united. But the Soviets mean one thing by union, and the Allies mean something else. The Soviets are for "unity and peace," meaning Soviet control of all Germany and control, if possible, without having to fight for it. The Western Allies are for unity and peace, meaning a democratic government for all of Germany and no civil war like the war in Korea. The Germans are for unity and peace. A few of them want the Soviet kind of unity and peace. But the vast majority, at least so far, prefer a Western type of united Germany if they can get it.

At Potsdam, in July and August 1945, President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill met to agree on policies for dealing with Germany. (Mr. Attlee replaced Mr. Churchill during the conference, as a result of the Labor victory in the British election.)

The powers at Yalta had already agreed to divide Germany into zones for administration but to set up a single Allied control to deal with problems of Germany

as a whole, such as the necessary trade between industrial areas in the West and food-producing lands in the East. There was also a clause in the agreement about "preparing" for setting up a democratic government in Germany, which was of course understood in opposite ways by Mr. Stalin and by the other Allies.

The Soviets had seized the eastern part of Poland, and in turn had turned over to Poland the German lands east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. That is, they had shoved Poland westward. Russia also took for herself the land of East Prussia. The Potsdam conference agreed to the expulsion of the Germans from these lands but provided that the final boundary of Germany would be settled in a peace treaty.

SOVIET OCCUPATION POLICIES

As the German occupation settled down to work, it became clear that the Soviets would run their zone to suit themselves and would pay no attention to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

All the Allies had entered Germany as enemies, determined to crush the Nazi military and political system. The Soviets did a thorough job of crushing East Germany, carrying off many of the industrial plants and requisitioning farm and factory products as reparations. Then they began to build a satellite state in their zone. The principal industries still left in working order were combined into trusts with Soviet agents in control. East Germans were drafted in

Soviets are demolishing the old Royal Palace to make room for a Red Square like the one in Moscow.

large numbers to work as slaves in Russia and in the uranium mines of Saxony.

The consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Germany has followed the usual satellite methods. Opposition parties were left for a time as fronts, but their leaders were purged and the parties were either brought into communist control or abolished. The Socialist Unity Party, representing the Communists, was given control of the government. A communist youth organization called the Free German Youth (*Freie Deutsche Jugend* or *FDJ*) was set up, similar to the Hitler Youth, and young people were forced to join in order to have jobs, admission to sports, and a

chance to get an education. A "National Front" was organized to train and manage the spies and saboteurs who are sent to Western Germany, where the Front representatives outrank the weak West German Communist Party.

The puppet government of East Germany has been required to confirm all seizures of German territory by the Soviets and Poland, matters that according to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements were to be settled by the Allies in a peace treaty. It has had to acknowledge that all German prisoners held by Russia have now been returned, although all Germans know that to be a lie. It has abolished the secret ballot, while proclaiming that the ballot is free and secret, and has taken over the administration of three large concentration camps.

The Nazi concentration camp of Sachsenhausen now has 16,000 new tenants. (Photographed secretly between rounds of the sentry.)

All these are the usual operations in a communist satellite country as the Soviet octopus tightens its grip on one feature after another of the political, economic, and personal life of its victims.

After observing the way the Soviets were tightening their hold on the Eastern zone, the Western Powers were convinced that Western Germany could not be made self-supporting unless it could be organized without waiting for cooperation from the Soviets. A Federal Republic, based on free elections in the three Western zones, was set up on September 21, 1949. In reply the Soviets set up a provisional "German Democratic Republic" in the Soviet zone, under complete communist control. They asserted that this "Republic" would be the legitimate government for all of Germany.

The government of the Soviet zone was entrusted to Communist Germans under strict Soviet control. Ex-Nazis and ex-members of the German Army were organized into two police forces, the usual secret police to terrorize the people, and a militarized police with regular army equipment, of about 50,000 men, designed as a training force for a Communist army. The outbreak in Korea aroused apprehensions in the Western world about what the Soviets might be preparing to do in Germany.

WESTERN GERMAN REPUBLIC

Meanwhile, the Western German Federal Republic was organized, with over-all authority over the States

or *Laender*, each of which has its own legislature elected by the people. The Federal and State governments are supervised by a High Commission made up of civilian representatives of the three Occupying Powers. The High Commission's policy is to give the Germans freedom and equality as fast as possible. They must be free to learn by experience in running a democratic government, with the normal troubles and lessons that all democracies have to take.

This is the scene on which the political game of Soviet propaganda, threats, pressures, and sabotage is being played for the control of all Germany. The side that wins control of Germany may well control Europe and the fate of civilization.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
International boundary
Land boundary
Federal capital
Land capital
STATUTE MILES
KILOMETERS
DENMARK
BALTIC SEA
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
KIEL
Kiel Canal
Lübeck
HAMBURG
MECKLENBURG
SCHWERIN
BREMEN
NETH.
NIEDERSACHSEN
POLISH ADM.
BERLIN
POTSDAM
BRANDENBURG
HANNOVER
Münster
NORDRHEIN-
WESTFALEN
Dortmund
Essen
Ruhr
Kassel
DÜSSELDORF
Köln
Aachen
BONN
Liège
SACHSEN-ANHALT
HALLE
Leipzig
DRESDEN
WEIMAR
THURINGIA
SAXONY
HESSEN
BELG.
Koblenz
Frankfurt am Main
WIESBADEN
MAINZ
RHEINLAND-
PFALZ
Darmstadt
Schweinfurt
Hof
Aue
PRAGUE (Praha)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
LUXEMBOURG
Ludwigshafen
SAAR
SAARBRÜCKEN
Heidelberg
Nürnberg
Metz
WÜRTTEMBERG-
BADEN
BAVARIA
Karlsruhe
STUTTGART
Nancy
Strasbourg
Danube
Passau
FRANCE
TÜBINGEN
WÜRTTEMBERG-
HOHENZOLLERN
MUNICH (München)
BADEN
FREIBURG
Salzburg
Friedrichshafen
Rhine
SWITZERLAND
LIECHTENSTEIN
AUSTRIA
BERN
ITALY
6
8
10
12
14
54
52
50
48

DENMARK
BALTIC SEA
KIEL
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
Stralsund
Rostock
Wismar
Lübeck
Swinemünde (Świnoujście)
HAMBURG
HAMBURG
SCHWERIN
MECKLENBURG
Stettin (Szczecin)
Oder
Templin
POLISH
Königsberg (Chojna)
Elbe
NIEDERSACHSEN
HANNOVER
BERLIN
Küstrin (Kostrzyn)
ADM.
Brandenburg
POTSDAM
Frankfurt an der Oder
Braunschweig
Helmstedt
Hildesheim
BRANDENBURG
Fürstenberg
Oder
Magdeburg
Guben
Halberstadt
Dessau
Cottbus
SACHSEN-ANHALT
Göttingen
HALLE
Leipzig
Neisse
Görlitz
Elbe
DRESDEN
HESSEN
Eisenach
Erfurt
WEIMAR
Jena
SAXONY
Gotha
Gora
Chemnitz
THURINGIA
Zwickau
Aue
Plauen
"GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC"
International boundary
Land boundary
Capital
Land capital
STATUTE MILES
KILOMETERS
BAVARIA
Schweinfurt
10
11
12
13
14
15
54
53
52
51
50

THE WHITSUNTIDE MARCH

WHITSUNDAY, a Christian holiday, seems at first sight a strange date for a communist rally, but the Soviets knew what they were about.

In Germany, Whitsuntide is a traditional spring festival. Young people go into the woods for beech twigs and branches to decorate their hats and bicycles. Farm wagons are decked out in bunting and greenery. This is the time for youth, song, and the freshness of new life.

The Christian religion, when it spread among the European tribes, took over their heathen festivals and worked them into our Christmas and Easter customs. The Soviets set out to take over the Christian festival of Whitsuntide in the same way.

PLANS FOR FDJ RALLY

The great communist show for the Germans in the spring of 1950 was a meeting in Berlin of the Free German Youth, or FDJ. In advance this was blown up to terrifying proportions. The FDJ, determined to get peace and unity, would "march on Berlin" and would show their enthusiasm by marching through the streets of West Berlin, under the noses of the Allied soldiers and the West Berlin police.

All Germans remembered the Hitler Youth. The thought of possibly a million communist young people parading the streets of West Berlin was not a comfortable one. The East Berlin police, some of whom

Communist Youth Organization marches in East Berlin in Whitsuntide rally.

are Communists, might well be expected to come along as guards for the unarmed youngsters. The slightest disturbance could set off a howling riot. West Berlin might be captured, or at least the Allied soldiers might be forced to shoot. It was a fair guess that the Soviet authorities hoped to needle the Western forces into "massacring" unarmed boys and girls. That would make a useful point for propaganda on the "merciless brutality of the capitalist warmongers."

The West Berlin government and the Allied forces met this challenge by declaring that any organized invasion of the Allied zones would be prevented by force at the border. The Soviet plans may have been no more than a bluff. In any case, something led them to decide not to defy the Allied warning, and no march on West Berlin was attempted.

The young people, however, visited West Berlin in large numbers, and they were generally made welcome. More than two thirds of the West Berliners, according to a sample poll, saw or talked with members of the FDJ during the rally.

WEST BERLIN OBSERVATIONS ON RALLY

The FDJ rally, as it was actually carried out, consisted only of vast meetings and parades designed to impress the Berliners and the boys and girls who took part. The West Berliners who were polled after the rally were not impressed in the way the Soviets had intended. The opinions of the people of West

Berlin are entitled to respect, for they have shown extraordinary courage, understanding, and humor during the years of the occupation. Hitler himself had found Berlin hard to control, and the stubborn love of freedom of this peculiar breed of Germans has only been toughened by the war and its aftermath.

Estimates of the number attending the rally varied up to 700,000, but few of the West Berliners thought there were as many as half a million. Most of them felt that the FDJ members whom they met were not generally Communists. All sorts of reasons were given for their attendance at the rally. The most common reason given for belonging to the FDJ was that membership is required in order to get an education, hold a job, get access to recreation facilities, and stay out of a work camp. Members were threatened with penalties if they failed to attend the Berlin rally. They were also lured by promises of a jamboree and a chance to see the town, with a pair of shoes and extra food thrown in. They evidently liked the marching and singing, which were of course very impressive. But the large number who visited West Berlin talked as if they were much surprised by what they saw there.

In West Berlin, the Americans regard the life of the German population as extremely austere and drab. But the comments of the West Berliners on the reactions of the FDJ boys throw an interesting light on how the inhabitants themselves regard their situation. According to many of those who had observed the young tourists, the youngsters were astonished at how com-

fortably the West Berliners live. "They saw that we have more to eat; they saw that we are better off; they saw crammed shops in the West sectors and recognized communist lies." Some of them are said to have recognized the difference in political freedom, "the difference between a real democracy and a people's democracy."

Apparently the West Berliners, in the midst of all their hardships, regard themselves as Exhibit A in the delights and benefits of living in free Western civilization and were so regarded by some of the East German FDJ who came to observe them.

It is probable that the mass psychology of so large a gathering must have had its effect in giving the young people a feeling that communism is a wave of the future. On the other hand, apparently some of the Eastern FDJ were alienated by discovering that they had been told lies by their communist leaders.

Altogether, the West Berliners liked the FDJ youngsters; "they were nice and peaceful, simple naive boys and girls, etc."; they were pleased and surprised in West Berlin "like newborn children in a fabulous world"; did not want to leave; were depressed and scared at the thought of going home. Some observers laid stress on how ill-fed and shabby they looked—"undisciplined and ill-bred, poor, ragged young people"; but the majority felt that most of the FDJ were just ignorant youngsters, more or less dazzled and misled by lies, but most of them not actually Communists.

On the other hand, the rally seems to have been clearly a success in its effect on the FDJ of Western Germany. The Western authorities refused to give passes for FDJ members to attend this rally, and many were caught and prevented from getting to Berlin. But about thirty or forty thousand, mostly boys, are believed to have escaped the border police and reached Berlin. They came home bursting with enthusiasm and gloating over their successful defiance of authority. Many had been stopped and held for several hours on their way back into Western Germany. They reacted by staging some enjoyable riots that put the frosting on the cake.

The Western members were of a somewhat tougher type than the Eastern young people, since they had not been recruited by pressure, fear, and bribes, but had joined the FDJ voluntarily. Most of them, therefore, were convinced Communists before going to Berlin, and they were ready to accept enthusiastically all the well-planned propaganda speeches that they heard at the meetings. They were shown selected enterprises in East Berlin and were impressed with the fact that unemployment, their main trouble at home, does not exist in the Soviet zone.

There is evidence that, since the return of the Western FDJ members, the organization in the Western zones has taken on new life and has increased in membership.

RESULTS OF THE WHITSUNTIDE MEETING

Taking it all together, it is fair to say that the Whitsuntide meeting of the FDJ had a disquieting degree of success in its main purpose of uniting the young people under the communist banner. The Soviets proved, as anyone could have predicted, that they could muster nearly half a million young people. They did a good selling job to the West German boys who were already Communists and probably gained some ground with the East German young people. But they did not terrify the people of West Berlin. In face of Allied firmness, the East Germans flinched their plan for a march into the Western sectors of the city. On the contrary, thousands of the East German young people got away from the planned program and wandered into West Berlin, where the free West Berliners took them in and gave them cookies and a picture of life in a democracy. The incident served to dramatize the encouraging fact that Soviet propaganda does not always stand up perfectly in direct contact with Western civilization, but it also demonstrated that our Soviet competitors are master hands at mass salesmanship.

THE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN WESTERN GERMANY

OUTSIDE the Iron Curtain, Soviet propaganda aims to exploit every point of weakness in each nation that it is attacking. Communism is a disease in the same class with tuberculosis. The germ can be found almost anywhere, waiting to take hold of any population that is suffering from low vitality for any reason whatever. Physical hardship and moral discouragement are likely to open the way for communist activity as well as for tuberculosis.

Communist infiltration among people who can read and listen freely to the radio is planned mainly to create confusion and disorganization. Comparatively few will be persuaded to accept communist theories, or even to swallow the idea of cooperation with the Communist Party, but large numbers may miscalculate their own interests, yield to emotional prejudices, and fall into useless squabbles, in part as the result of well-planned communist needling.

In Germany, the Communist Party itself has been shrinking since its peak in the worst period of distress after the war. In 1950 the party was down to about 200,000 members, and a third of these were being carried on the rolls although their dues were unpaid. In-

cluding sympathizers, there seem to be no more than 5 percent of the West Germans who could be regarded as favorable to the Communist Party. But that figure does not represent the real situation.

Outside the native communist organization, there are many thousands of agents in West Germany who have been sent in by the Soviet and East German authorities. These agents are independent of the local Communists and may even be unknown to them. They are the spearhead of the drive. They are far less interested in making converts than in making bad feeling between German classes, between West Germans and the Allies, and among French, British, and Americans. It is in this work of confusion and bad feeling that the communist agents are helped by every kind of hardship, every mistake, and every instance of corruption or wrongdoing that comes to public attention on our side of the line.

WEAKNESSES FROM DEFEAT IN WAR

The most important material weakness of Western Germany is unemployment, since it leaves thousands of people, especially the refugees, with a feeling of being unwanted by anyone—except by the Communists. Next is the physical hardship caused by war devastation not yet repaired, especially in housing. Beyond these physical disadvantages there are great weaknesses to be found in the political habits of the people—their training in authoritarian methods and submission to authority, and the traditional class

prejudices that interfere with democratic government and economic recovery. Finally there is the over-all psychological effect of defeat, of the universal condemnation of their country and Hitler's "Kultur" by the rest of the world, and the knowledge that their country is divided and helpless. The degree of mental health already in evidence among the West Germans in the face of all these weaknesses, is encouraging; and in West Berlin it is extraordinary. But further progress depends on treatment designed to reduce the dangers that lie in the weak points of the German situation.

Physically, the war devastation of Germany was such that severe hardship was inevitable for a long period after the end of hostilities. Factories used in the war effort had been quickly repaired after they were hit during the war. But the total productive capacity of German industry was necessarily left at a point far below the prewar level. Agriculture was short of animals, machines, and fertilizer. Housing, especially in the cities, was destroyed or heavily damaged, and hardly any repairs had been possible during the fighting. Railway and highway transport had been successfully crippled by the Allies before the Nazis surrendered.

PROBLEM CREATED BY REFUGEES

These natural conditions of hardship caused by war damage have been greatly aggravated by the refugee problem. With an employed population of about 14 million in 1950, Western Germany had to deal with 9

million people who had been expelled from communist countries or had escaped over the border in search of freedom. Most of the refugees speak German, but they do not settle easily into West Germany. According to estimates made early in 1950 by the Berlin Institute of Economic Research, 12½ million West Germans were living on relief, insurance, or pensions. Refugees alone were costing the taxpayers a fifth of the Federal budget.

Considering the relative size of the employed population, the United States would have somewhat the same problems if we had just been through a nation-wide earthquake, had a relief roll of 50 million people, and had taken in 40 million survivors from the destruction of Great Britain, all of whom had arrived destitute and half starved, and many of them suffering from severe emotional shock. If our Federal revenues had shrunk to 12 billion dollars and we were spending over 2 billion on the British refugee camps, it is easy to imagine that American politics would be heated. To make the picture more like the German situation, we must also imagine that our 40 million British guests have the right to vote and that they do not enjoy life in camp on a budget of $50 apiece per year. Moreover, even the fortunate ones who have been able to move in with American friends or relatives, in their half-ruined houses, are not really happy. It is no exaggeration to say that such a picture is no worse than what the West Germans are seeing in their own country.

What we cannot well imagine, beyond the physical

difficulties of such a situation, is the effect on morale of having been crushed in war by the outraged forces of practically the whole world. It is not surprising that the recovery of Germany is beset with difficulties and that many weak points are open to communist pressure.

From a distance it is easy to overlook the fact that Germans differ among themselves as much as Americans. In Eastern Germany the differences of attitude and opinion are ruthlessly suppressed. But, in the Western zones, our effort to encourage democratic forms of government requires that differences among localities, classes, and individuals be given as free play as the safety of the country can allow. Even a classification of varieties of German opinion must be salted with the recognition that individuals have their own problems and ideas.

SOURCES OF WEAKNESS IN BUSINESS WORLD

The business world of Western Germany has several weak points of different origin. One is the prewar habit of Eastern trade to balance manufactured goods with food supplies. Another is the fear of what might happen if the Communists should come and the Western Powers should fail to stop them. Still another is the remains of the old habit of authoritarian control, which has more affinity for Eastern than for Western forms of government.

The industries of Western Germany have always depended on trade with the East, where food supplies

could be had in exchange for factory products, even though the bulk of Germany's prewar trade was with Western countries. Since the war, recovery in the Western zones has been encouraging in general, but food has been imported from the United States and Canada, and it has had to be paid for in dollars. German manufactures have been hard to sell in the United States and Canada, largely because we make about the same goods. Moreover since the war, German efficiency has fallen behind, and the quality and price have not been up to our standards.

The Soviet policy is to encourage trade with Western Germany, especially in contraband goods that the Soviets need for military purposes. Prices are made attractive, both to encourage actual smuggling and to divert the attention of Western businessmen from the job of winning a place in Western world trade.

The Soviets are prepared to offer some quantities of grain, other than wheat, for sale in Western Europe, although there is no real surplus behind the Iron Curtain. This grain they are able to squeeze out of the satellite countries by imposing an extremely low standard of living. It is good politics to offer the West Europeans release from their dollar problems by supplying grain. They would then have a ruble problem instead, which the Soviets are more than ready to relieve by buying war material from the West.

There are also many political advantages to the Communists in attracting the attention of Western business, such as getting contributions to the Communist

Party, preventing anti-communist activities among businessmen, and propagating the idea that German unity on communist terms is not unthinkable.

Another point of weakness is the fact that industrialists and businessmen are necessarily tied to their factories and real estate, which cannot be carried off in a bag if they should ever have to flee before a communist invasion. They know all too well what a refugee looks like. Communist peace propaganda on the radio does not relieve their fears by its talk of peace and its constant charges of Anglo-American imperialism. It keeps them constantly reminded that the communist "peace" is heading in their direction and that they do not see many Anglo-American divisions standing in the way. If the time were to come when they had a choice between liquidation and taking a job as a technician under Soviet control, those who had not been too strongly anti-communist might have the best chance to survive. The local Communists are active in trying to sell this kind of "insurance" and sometimes they are successful.

The tradition of dictatorial authority is common among older business and industrial leaders in Germany, as it is among the upper social, military, and political classes. In some industries this tradition interferes with the adoption of new techniques, especially the modern techniques of "human-relations engineering" that are so highly successful in many American firms. The main effects are that some of the industries are slow about improving their methods and

stubborn about raising wages. Costs are too high, exports are hard to sell, and workers are not fully employed. The workers who have jobs do not get the kind of living standard that will make them immune to communism. An American skilled worker gets about five times the wages of his German opposite number, and yet the American employer can outsell his German competitor in almost any field. This condition is a weakness that gives scope for some communist propaganda and for much discontent that the Communists can help to fan.

BAD INFLUENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment is especially bad in its influence on the young in Germany. German young people have had most of the wrong experiences to fit them for taking part in a healthy democratic society. Their childhood memories of the Hitler youth organizations are in the main pleasant ones. Young people need as much as older ones, or even more, to belong to something, and the Communists offer a chance to belong to the Free German Youth, on the same lines as the Hitler Youth.

Lack of a job makes the need for organization all the more pressing. There are, to be sure, many democratic youth organizations springing up in Western Germany, but they do not sufficiently meet the social and spiritual needs of all German young people. An inevitable weakness is that any democratic group has

to regard unemployment as a "problem" that can be cured only by finding the answer. A Nazi or Communist organization, operating in Western Germany, can blame it all on Western capitalist imperialism, appealing to primitive emotion with no need for thought. In Eastern Germany, unemployment is avoided by making the people work for the Soviets. It is encouraging to find that the majority of German young people have so far resisted the anti-democratic appeals for their support. But the situation is not one that can be safely neglected.

In spite of the hardships of unemployment and low wages, the labor unions are the backbone of Western

Anticommunist labor union headquarters in Berlin.

German resistance to communist infiltration. Hitler abolished free labor unions and set up the "German Labor Front," a labor organization to prevent the workers' having any rights. The Soviet zone government has done the same thing, setting up a single union to direct and regiment the workers in line with communist plans. All this is well known to free German labor and helps to protect it from communist influences.

As soon as the Hitler government collapsed, the workers started to organize free unions, which in 1949 were joined into a German Trade Union Federation. Only 5 percent were Communists; and as time has gone on the unions have been gradually purging Communist officers.

Communist strength among workers was at its highest in the Ruhr and other industrial areas of the State of North Rhine - Westphalia immediately after the war. The progress of this area is shown by election results in the State elections of 1947 and 1949. The Communists got 14 percent of the votes in 1947, and fell to 5.5 percent in 1949. At the same time the businessmen's party increased its popular vote to 12.1 percent, while the extreme right parties, more or less Nazi in their attitude, fell to a total of less than 2 percent of the vote. The workers evidently voted for the middle parties in larger numbers than ever before.

The national election of 1949 resulted in overwhelming victories for the middle parties, although no one of them got a majority in the Bundestag, or Lower House. The Government was formed by the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union in an alliance with two parties somewhat farther to the right but not Nazi.

The chief opposition group, with 131 members out of 402, is the Social Democratic Party. The Communists, with 15 delegates, and the splinter parties of the far right, with 21, represent the forces opposed to democratic government as such.

The present government is in a better position than the Weimar Republic that followed World War I for several reasons. The various administrations during the Weimar period varied from "left-center" to "right-center," but always with a strong conservative bloc that at heart was hostile to the whole idea of democracy. The present government represents a more mature attitude on both sides. The liberal-conservative majority has learned, at least for the moment, not to flirt with the Nazi lunatic fringe, and the socialist opposition is the strongest anti-communist element in the state.

All the parties, however, are less democratic in their structure than the major parties in the United States. Their central committees have a somewhat tighter control over policies and nominations. The rank-and-file members, on the other hand, vote much more often

Left to right: High Commissioner John J. McCloy, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

than we do in the United States, and there is growing popular criticism of arbitrary decisions by party leaders. Chancellor Adenauer, in particular, has had to make public disavowal of any intention of deciding the military policies of Germany without the consent of the legislature.

The communist propaganda paints Chancellor Adenauer and Mr. Schumacher, leader of the Socialists, as stooges and quislings of the Anglo-American imperialists. All the middle parties are strongly anti-

communist; the Socialists are especially hated by the Communists because they get so much of the labor vote away from the Communist Party. The far right parties, such as they are, usually talk anti-communist and vote with the Communists.

In the summer of 1950 a serious scandal broke out with the report that a number of members of the new Federal legislature had been bribed in connection with the choice of Bonn as the capital city. This scandal, of course, was meat for the communist propaganda, which even went so far as to accuse the Americans of promoting the bribery so as to be in a position to blackmail the delegates.

To the politically inexperienced German voter it seems logical that, if nazism and communism are not democracy, what he has now must be democracy. Anything he sees wrong with what he has now is wrong with democracy. Americans with longer democratic experience realize that, although there is plenty wrong with the government and with other features of any democratic country, the important fact is that the people can improve these conditions as fast as they decide how to go about it—and that no other way to get improvement is really practical. This feature of democratic progress, and the patience that it requires, cannot be easily or quickly taught to a population brought up on centralized authority, and the Communists take full advantage of the situation to point out the imaginary perfection of their own system.

Those Germans who are still at heart in favor of nazism, of the orthodox militarist tradition, or of the extreme rightist position in big business, are a source of weakness, and are peculiarly susceptible to communist influence. Nazis and Communists worked together before Hitler came to power, many Communists joining the Nazi brownshirts for the uniforms and pay. The money came in part from big business sources.

Hitler made much of Germany's position as the defender of Europe against the barbarians from the East. But ever since Napoleon had conquered Germany and attacked Russia, there had been much in common between the upper military and social classes in Germany and in Russia. The Tsar was closely related to the Kaiser. Bismarck's policy was always to cooperate with Russia. Now that Russia has a new ruling class as dictatorial as the old aristocracy, some of the old feeling of kinship is still to be found among extreme conservatives in Germany, from the Junkers to the ex-Nazis.

Accordingly, while the Soviet propaganda calls the Western powers fascist imperialists and accuses us of using Nazi methods against the Communists, actually the East German Government is using large numbers of Nazi and Junker officers in its militarized police. Communist agents are recruiting army officers from the same classes in Western Germany and are offering various kinds of opportunity to other members of the

old ruling classes who do not feel at home in the new democracy. There is some feeling among the aristocrats that they might make terms with the Soviet aristocracy and because of their experience and ability might become indispensable and powerful members of the Soviet ruling class.

The actual number of upper-class and Nazi sympathizers with communism is probably small, judging by the voting strength of the right extremist parties. But many of them are important for wealth and social position, and they may attract middle-class support if living conditions do not improve. The tendency for the extreme right to play with treason must be listed as a definite weak point in the democratic cause.

EFFECT OF REFUGEE POLITICS

The condition of the refugees and expellees who are living in Western Germany is a serious weakness. First of all, the Western Germans do not wholeheartedly welcome these destitute, nerve-wracked poor relations who have been dumped into their midst. Neither the industrial plant nor the agricultural land of Western Germany has room for the number of people who are now crowded into the country. The refugees, moreover, often seem as foreign to West Germans as British refugees would seem to Americans. Customs, religion, and political ideas are often barriers to understanding and sympathy. But out-

ranking all other causes of trouble is the fact that the fear of unemployment in any country always rouses hostility toward any race, creed, or nationality that offers competition for jobs.

Many of the newcomers were expelled by the Russian Army from German territory that was given to Poland. These people are not reconciled; they want their homes back. For instance, on October 15, 1950, 180,000 expellees from Silesia staged a demonstration in Cologne and demanded the return of their homeland to Germany.

Refugees who have escaped from East zone waiting to hitch a ride.

The fact that the puppet government of the Eastern zone has had to accept the loss of these eastern lands as final did not help the Communists in Western Germany. Not only the Silesians but all Germans outside the Communist Party resent the loss of these eastern territories.

Many of the refugees have escaped from the Soviet zone, after experiences of Soviet oppression that have driven them to the other extreme. Many of them, therefore, are apt to be somewhere in the political far right. Life in refugee camps does not nourish the ideal dream of life in the free world, which may have been in the minds of many a refugee when he risked everything to escape from the other side of the Iron Curtain. As time goes on, unless they are absorbed into normal jobs and become adjusted to their new homes, some of them might be open to Communist offers, in spite of what they know about life under Soviet rule. The Communists, of course, would have no scruples about promising to give the Germans their land again, if promising would serve the Soviet purposes.

All these points of weakness are well known to the Communists, who devote their energies to rubbing salt into every wound and dropping poison into every discouraged heart. The counterattack on communist efforts has to consist in part of education to undo the mental confusion created by communist propaganda. But the main counterattack has to be in the slow job of building up the physical standard of living of the

people, opening new jobs for the unemployed, and training the people in political life by giving them practice in operating democratic forms of government. Encouraging progress has already been made, but, even if the Communists do not launch a military attack on Western Germany, their infiltration will be dangerous for a long time to come.

THE Communists pour their propaganda into Western Germany mainly through their radio in Berlin, assisted by the West German communist newspapers and miscellaneous hand-out material coming over the border. The propaganda is composed in part of the Soviet world-wide line made familiar to Americans through the orations of the Soviet delegates to the United Nations. In addition there are special items that propaganda experts believe will appeal particularly to the West Germans, and still others for the tough, unterrified people of West Berlin.

EASTERN GERMANY FOR PEACE

In camouflaging the picture of East Germany, the Soviet propaganda often makes use of what is called "projection." Projection is the art of covering your own crimes by loudly accusing your opponents of doing what you are actually doing yourself. Thus the Soviet reply to American protests over the arming of East Germany was merely to accuse the Americans of arming West Germany for aggression against the peaceful East Germans. The advantage of this technique is that it may fool the numerous people who do

not happen to know which came first. Thus any attempt to build up resistance to a threat of attack can be called aggression, and some people in the threatened country may be fooled as they see signs of military preparations in their own country. It is not necessary to convince a majority; mere confusion is worth the cost of the propaganda. Hitler used the projection trick often, and with some success, in his propaganda to the United States.

The East Germans are suffering from a generally low standard of living. Most of their important industrial plants have either been carted off to Russia or combined under the management of Russian-controlled trusts. Meanwhile the Marshall Plan has brought a considerable degree of recovery in West Germany. The Soviet authorities have met this situation by giving lists of food and consumer goods available in East Germany and by warning the West Germans that the Occupying Powers will make them pay for military defense with higher taxes and higher prices. Any slip in West Germany, such as a coal shortage, is of course seized as a sign of Allied oppression. The slogan is, "Short of Coal? Vote Communist."

But the main line of the story from East Germany is simply the old patent-medicine advertising trick of repeating "Sniffem Cures Colds" over and over. "The People's Democratic Republic of East Germany stands for democracy and peace." The National Front, which is the agitating agency of the Commu-

Soviet propaganda to turn Germans away from Western defense.

930135 O - 51 - 4

nists in Germany, presents a platform designed to appeal to any German who does not understand what is behind it. The National Front calls on all Germans to support: the preservation of peace; Germany's democratic unity; a peace treaty for all Germany; withdrawal of occupation troops (i.e. leaving no military forces in Germany except the communist-controlled East zone police); democratic reconstruction of German peace economy (this is Russian for organization of Soviet-controlled trusts); improvement of living standards "by the people's own efforts" (Molotov Plan instead of Marshall Plan); expansion and consolidation of democratic order (Russian for police state); and "protection and maintenance of German culture," whatever they mean by that.

The Communists do not hesitate to combine this noble-sounding propaganda with a line of personal talk by communist agents in Western Germany pointing out the military strength of the Soviet zone and of the Red Army and hinting that the unity of Germany will be imposed by force. "Peace" means simply the acceptance of Soviet power without fighting. The Western Powers are openly accused of wanting to attack Russia through Germany; but those who do not swallow this line are given to understand that the Western imperialists want to use Germany as a battleground rather than allow it to be united with the Eastern People's Republic.

Contradictory propaganda does not indicate com-

munist failure to use logic. Communist propaganda aims to persuade those who are too much confused to recognize its contradictions and to terrify those who can see the iron fist behind the olive branch. Before Korea, it is possible that the Soviets, though they knew there was no hope of persuading the majority of Germans to vote communist, had definite plans for confusing the West Germans and softening them for a coming invasion. The prolongation of the Korean civil war added force to the whole propaganda line. The tactics of combined peace talk and war threats will serve all the desired purposes. Whether there is to be "civil" war in Germany or not, confusion, fear, and blackmail in Western Germany are still communist objectives, and at these they have not entirely failed except in Berlin.

THE KOREA STORY, KREMLIN VERSION

The main line of Soviet propaganda is, of course, that the Soviets offer the world peace and prosperity, but that they are menaced by the Wall-Street-capitalist-monopoly-warmonger-imperialists who control the United States and are mustering the Western nations for aggressive war.

In 1950, this line was tailored for the Germans by featuring Korea and the news of Allied plans for arming the West Germans.

In Korea, according to the Soviet propaganda, "the United States was the aggressor, pushing its South

Korean puppet state into an attack on the People's Democracy of the North. For three months the brave North Koreans, inspired by a fighting faith in unity, democracy, and the hope of peace, threw back the brutal Americans, until at last the overwhelming military power of the United States was too much for poor little Korea. During all this time the Soviets, because they are first of all for peace, scrupulously kept out of the struggle, not even sending arms to the hard-pressed North Koreans." Thus they avoided giving America an excuse for starting the world war "that the Wall Street leaders are so anxious to begin."

But, as the propaganda carefully points out, "although the Americans were able to overwhelm the Korean patriots, they have lost out in Asia. The Asians have seen their aggression, they know of their brutality and the mass murders by savage American soldiers. They turn to Soviet Russia, their friend. The American imperialists, isolated by the righteous horror of mankind, will suffer the fate of Hitler whose ways they are aping."

One story has General MacArthur addressing his troops outside Seoul in the old-fashioned manner of the history books, with these inspiring words: "Men! Before you lies a rich city with plenty of wine and good food. Capture it and all the girls and riches in the city belong to you."

In the meantime, to stories of American brutality in Korea are added items about the misdeeds of Americans in Germany, and the Germans are assured

Soviet propaganda claims that Americans are liberating Korea to death and are planning to do the same to Germany.

that, as more American troops arrive, they will be subjected to outrages of every kind. They try to make West Berliners' blood run cold with tales of the 82d Airborne Division, slated for Berlin, an outfit "consisting entirely of gangsters and rapists."

ANTI-AMERICAN LINE

The Soviets take pains to talk as though Korea were an American, not a United Nations war. The only other troops fighting on our side are said to be Turks and Japanese, whom we are using as cannon-fodder. The Soviets say to the Germans: "You poor fools, when you were fighting the Soviets, the Americans allied themselves with the Soviets in order to destroy Germany. Now they want to push you into a war against the Soviets for their own imperialist purposes. You can do the dying while they supply the guns. Americans will die for Wall Street to the last German."

The Soviets say we want Germany only for space to retreat, while we get ready to try to hold the Rhine, or perhaps the Pyrenees, leaving the Germans to rot in cities once more smashed by war.

Communist pamphlets show pictures of "American atrocities" in Korea. They are easy to arrange. Any picture of corpses, prisoners, or natives suffering, is good enough to carry a story of American rapine and brutality. Whether the Germans believe the stories or not, the pictures remind them of what a war on German soil would be like.

Soviet propaganda line: "Dollar imperialism, the enemy of the German people."

Germans remember the first years of American occupation—the rules against fraternization, the black marketing by Americans, the official dismantling of industry, and the private "liberation" of cameras, jewelry, and other valuables by some of the Americans. Not so many Germans know of the immense quantities of Nazi loot discovered by the Americans and honestly preserved for return to the owners or sold for aid to refugees. The Soviets play on the memories of American ill-treatment of Germans, and say nothing of the brutal ravages of the Red Army, which also are in the German memory. The net effect is to produce a feeling of dread.

The free German press reported the Korean war honestly, in much the same way as the American press. The papers did not feature the resemblance to Germany, but no one forgot it.

When we were holding the beachhead of Pusan, the German morale was low. The Communists planned a series of demonstrations, and the local governments barely mustered the courage to forbid them.

When we landed at Inchon, the Germans perked up. The Western Powers began to talk of rearming the Germans as part of a West European defense army. Chancellor Adenauer took a favorable view of the idea, especially as it gave him a good bargaining position for demanding more freedom from control.

But communist propaganda had succeeded in giving the Germans a bad scare. Moreover, the Germans have naturally not forgotten that only a few years ago

we were calling them criminals and wild beasts and that our occupation policy has been to teach them peaceful ways. Our sudden invitation to fight and die for our side leaves many Germans cold.

GERMAN PACIFISM

Since 1914 the experiences of the German people have not been such as to toughen their courage to fight in face of heavy odds. They expected to win World War I, and nearly did so. Most of them believed their defeat was not a fair test of strength but that the Army was betrayed by the home front. In 1945 they knew they were defeated, after having once more almost gained the victory. In face of the tremendous Red Army, the older Germans, who have twice failed to win when their country was powerful, hesitate to beard the giant now that Germany is weak. The young men, who grew up in the Hitler Youth and the German Army, are disillusioned and cynical. The highly imperfect democracy offered by the West seems to many of them hardly worth dying for. A people that has tried aggression and taken terrible punishment is apt to have a pacifist attitude, for many different reasons appealing to different types of people.

The Soviets play upon every string of German pacifism with their constant hymns to peace and their constant implied threat of war. They report that Americans are enlisting German ex-officers for serv-

ice in Korea. (This is a "projection" to cover the fact that the Soviets have enlisted many ex-Nazi officers to help them in their East German police as well as for service elsewhere.) They speak of the proposed arming of Germans to help defend Europe as the hiring of "mercenaries" to pull American chestnuts out of the fire. They drip tears of sympathy for German mothers who shudder beneath the shadow of a United States war to be fought on German soil. They accuse Chancellor Adenauer and also Mr. Schumacher, Socialist leader of the opposition, of wanting more occupation troops to "protect their quisling hides from the fury of an outraged populace." They emphasize every sign of pacifism in Western Germany as a victory for their own brand of "peace," which it is, and as a sign of wide acceptance of the communist viewpoint, which it is not.

The chief non-communist resistance to the idea of German military service has come from two prominent Lutherans, Pastor Niemoeller, president of the Hessian Lutheran Church, and Gustav Heinemann, a leading layman of the Evangelical Church. Heinemann resigned as Minister of the Interior, charging that Chancellor Adenauer had secretly committed the government to a rearmament pact with the Western Powers without consulting the Cabinet.

Pastor Niemoeller's blasts against rearming were clearly not based on communist sympathies, nor was the resignation of Heinemann. They were pacifist moves. Heinemann said that he feared rearmament

might provoke a Soviet attack. The free press of West Germany was divided in its reaction to the position taken by these Lutheran leaders. Bishop Lilje of the Lutheran Church denied that Pastor Niemoeller represented Lutheran opinion. In the main, the press was opposed to the pacifist position. But the Chancellor was widely criticized for arbitrary behavior and replied in a speech assuring the country that no rearming agreement would be made without action by the parliament.

It is, of course, true enough that, when a country is threatened by an aggressor, the victim is caught in a dilemma. Failure to arm will bring on the attack later, when the aggressor is ready; and an attempt to arm may bring on the attack at once if the aggressor feels that he can get away with it. The pacifist position does not necessarily mean sympathy with the aggressor; it may mean only fear. It seems clear that, although Soviet propaganda has won few friends in Western Germany, it has had some influence by way of encouraging despair among a people still suffering from the shock of a crushing defeat.

In the fall of 1950, Mr. Schumacher was accusing the Chancellor of dictatorial behavior and of selling Germany's help to the Western Powers at too cheap a price. The reasons for Schumacher's position were complicated. The Socialists certainly were not playing communist politics, for they are the most bitterly anti-communist party in the country. But they evidently wanted the votes of Germans who had no desire

to bet on a sick horse. The possibility of actually defending Germany seemed so slight that it seemed good politics to wait till the Allies had more divisions before taking stock in the enterprise.

How successful Mr. Schumacher was in his politics the fall elections in several states showed all too well. The Socialists gained heavily. In this campaign the Communists kept carefully off the Socialists, whom they ordinarily call the lowest of all filthy animals. Their attitude was that of the cat who was enjoying the canary accidentally knocked down in the course of a family brawl.

Altogether, it appeared at the end of 1950 that the Soviets had pretty well succeeded in scaring some of the Germans out of any idea of playing in Germany the part so bravely played by the South Korean Army in Korea.

In Germany, our disadvantages are multiplied. In the first place, we are in Germany because we defeated the Germans in a war, not a good start for making friends. Then, each of the three Western Occupying Powers is under heavy political attack at home, while the Soviet troubles at home are kept quiet. Finally, we had a military defeat in Korea, under circumstances that weaken our power to send armies to defend Germany.

The beginning of 1951 finds the Soviet propaganda in Germany riding high, and only an increase of power in the free world as a whole, and a growing unity among the free peoples, will be likely to change the picture in our favor.

COMMUNISM AND A FREE PRESS

POLITICAL party newspapers were strictly regulated under the U. S. Military Government, but this strict control was relaxed in the summer of 1949. Instead, the Allied High Commission, in its Law No. 5, allowed such papers to be printed and specified limits of editorial freedom. The papers could discuss politics, but they must not undermine the "prestige or security" of the Occupying Powers.

Taken literally, Law No. 5 would not allow any communist papers, since the standard communist line is disrespectful toward the Western Powers. On the other hand, the High Commission is seriously trying to stick to the principle of democracy, including the essential element, a free press. Communist papers are, therefore, not suppressed merely because they always say that we are Wall Street fascist warmongers plotting to drench the world in blood. Several have been closed for two or three weeks for trying to promote riots, and, in September 1950, all but one of the communist newspapers were suspended for periods up to 90 days. But the general principle remains that Western Germany must show a contrast with the Soviet

East Berliners come to British sector for honest news from Korea.

zone by tolerating opposition, since that is exactly the point of the argument between Soviet and Western "democracies."

Ordinarily the Communist Party operates 16 newspapers in Western Germany, some of them weeklies. They are all comparatively small and run at a heavy financial loss, but the party has to support them to keep its members posted on the party line. They also hope, of course, to pick up new members. The leading paper is the *Freies Volk* or *Free People*, of Düssel-

dorf, the central party organ. All party officials have to read it in addition to the communist paper of their locality.

Since the peak days of 1946–48 the Communist Party in the Western zones has shrunk considerably, and the faithful are called upon to work hard to keep their press alive. Every member must take at least one subscription to his party paper, preferably more than one, and must try to pass the paper around among his neighbors or fellow workers. The resemblance to any small struggling church of an unpopular sect is close. The members all solicit subscriptions, and those who have special talents work on the paper for little or no pay.

Editing is done by party officials as part of their job, since they are the best informed on the latest twists of the party line. The writing is done by members who, as a rule have other jobs as well, such as collecting information for the espionage network.

COMMUNIST WRITING

Writing for the communist press is simple in its main principles, though subject always to the danger of slipping off the party line, especially on a sharp curve. Local news items are picked up and reported, not according to what happened but "angled" according to the line. A communist rally of 68 people is a mass meeting of 500 enthusiastic peace fighters. Any improvement in the supply of consumer goods

in the free areas is a statistical lie of the Wall Street monopolist exploiters who are enslaving the helpless people of Western Europe. A drunken brawl in our territory, or a graft scandal in the government, is the outrageous oppression of a ruffianly army of conquerors or a plot engineered by the Americans to reduce the puppet West German colonial government to easy compliance with the warmongering plans of American imperialism. It is evident that all Communists have an enduring faith in the effect of repeating long and nasty words, even when their subscription lists are discouragingly small and gradually shrinking.

Communist propaganda has its strong and dangerous features, but the day-to-day output of the communist press in Western Germany has not succeeded in gripping the imagination of millions of readers in competition with the free newspapers of the area.

PRESSURES EXERTED BY COMMUNIST PAPERS

The actions of the communist authorities in East Germany, especially the arming of a large force of "police," seem to have helped the Western communist press rather more than any popular interest in its printed matter. The comrades who solicit advertising have a habit of pointing out to businessmen the possibility of "liberation" by forces from the East, even while their editors were piously holding

up the Soviets as the evangelists of peace. Some of the advertising, therefore, is not what you would expect to find in a communist paper in the United States. The *Freies Volk*, for instance, had one special supplement featuring the advertisements of most of the big Ruhr steel and coal companies. As Western Germany is located exactly in front of the cannon's mouth, it is not surprising that many businessmen feel the need for taking out some insurance by buying space in the communist press.

Other businessmen who are not Communists use the party papers merely to reach that part of the consumer market, since party members are urged not to read any papers but their own; or they may have hopes of selling behind the Iron Curtain. Still others, in places where the party is strongest among the workers, have been influenced by a natural desire to avoid accidents to their machinery. Then there are, also, of course, some advertisements placed by men who are party members or sympathizers.

With all these sources of advertising revenue and the subscriptions of loyal party followers, the papers are forced to struggle along with heavy deficits that have to be made up out of party funds. It is clearly not the communist press that supports and maintains the small communist movement in the Western zones. The Soviet contributions of both money and manpower, together with some blackmail based on Soviet threats, keep the party alive with its propaganda organs attached.

LITERATURE FROM OVER THE BORDER

In the early years of the Occupation printed matter was allowed to circulate freely across the border between Western and Soviet Germany. The attitude of the Western Powers was that on balance a free exchange of ideas was beneficial. So long as the facts are generally favorable to our side, we can well afford to trade our material for any lies the Soviet may see fit to print. This is still the attitude on our side, if we could get a fair exchange.

The Soviets evidently agree that our newspapers, books, and magazines will do more harm to communist plans in Eastern Europe than an equal tonnage of their output can do to our plans in the West. At the time of the blockade of Berlin the Soviet authorities took the occasion to close the border to Western printed material. In retaliation the Western Powers clamped an embargo on Soviet publications from East Germany, not as a matter of principle but merely to apply pressure for getting back to free exchange. Smuggling is the natural result of this situation.

The border guards sometimes find a load of hay containing material that only a goat would care to chew; and no doubt a fair tonnage of paperwork slips across. The difficulties of smuggling tend to encourage the use of small handbills, stickers, etc., especially for the expression of sentiments that would be illegal for the Western communist presses to turn out. Newsstands seldom care to carry the smuggled items, but

"Truth" pamphlets from the East German zone: (1) Communist defendants in New York. (2) "Happy" boys who have escaped from West Germany into the Soviet "paradise."

they are distributed at party headquarters and are passed out in crowds, left on doorsteps or stuck on walls by faithful party workers.

A favorite sticker simply says, "Ami Go Home." Ami is not the French word meaning friend, but is a



slang word understood by all to refer disparagingly to the Americans. Handbills urge young Germans not to bring down the horrors of war on their heads, but to join the National Front and bring unity and peace to the Fatherland under the leadership of their emancipated brethren in East Germany.

The Western Powers, though they ordered an embargo at the border, do not suffer from the violent jitters that the communist authorities always show when hostile scraps of paper are found flying about.

Just before the "election" of October 15, 1950, the East German authorities were much upset by a rash of anti-communist stickers that broke out in their zone. Since the election was fixed to give the Communists a vote of 99.7 percent, such evidences of disrespect were not to be tolerated. The party was ordered to set up night guards to stop the posting of such stickers, and highway patrols were sent out to search the traffic for contraband paper. Stickers, wall-marking, and similar Hallowe'en tricks are effective in the countries under Soviet control, as they were in Western Europe when it was occupied by the Nazis. The masters of a totalitarian state cannot stand any sort of catcall; it spoils the religious effect they are trying to create.

In the Western zone, the police tear down stickers, especially when they call for staging a riot on a certain date, and masses of such material are sometimes confiscated in raids. But no effort to prevent all communist printing is thought necessary.

In the fall of 1950, after all but one of the party

Anti-Soviet Bund of European Youth defies patrols in East Germany.

newspapers had been suspended, the party went back to simple news sheets which are generally permitted. These are usually mimeographed and are sold for a few pfennigs. In some of the states the communist members of the legislature took advantage of legislative immunity to get out a small newspaper. There was also evidence of a planned campaign of carefully designed letters to the editor, to be sent to the free newspapers. One free newspaper in West Germany ventured into an exchange of letters with the *Neues Deutschland*, the organ of the Communist Party in

Eastern Germany. This opening gave the Eastern Communists a chance for a calm, well-written article addressed to businessmen, describing the profitable opportunities for trade with the Eastern zone and other satellite countries. As there is unavoidably a large smuggling trade, this article was a point won by the Communists.

COMMUNIST RIOTS

THE Communists like to promote riots for three main purposes. A riot, whether quickly brought under control or not, weakens the authority of the government under which it breaks out. A riot may happen to draw in more people than the Communists who engineer it, giving an exaggerated

Communists try to break through West Berlin police lines on the border. There was no bloodshed; nightsticks were not used.

impression of discontent or of communist power. In any case the communist news story can easily multiply the number engaged. All they need is an undoubted riot, preferably with shooting, and they can salt the report to suit. A third advantage of a good riot is that it is a peg on which to hang wild propaganda stories for use in distant lands, of bloody revolt in Western countries, and massacre of revolutionary masses by the minions of the capitalist tyrants.

The Communist Party in Western Germany is a feeble band, not well adapted to successful rioting, so it is customary to depend on the local Free German Youth organization, with reinforcements of selected, tough FDJ members sent from the Eastern zone to help out.

With the growth of the Western FDJ groups after the Berlin rally, the Communists decided to use this youth group as the active force in a series of monster demonstrations on "Peace Day," October 1, 1950. Thousands of Eastern FDJ lads were to be sent in, especially to the Ruhr, where the Communists are especially interested in slowing the growth of production.

Plans captured in a raid on party headquarters showed that the Communists hoped to have 30,000 marchers in Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven, and from five to ten thousand in other northwestern cities. A large proportion of these were to be trained rioters from the Eastern zone.

The city and State governments prohibited the

principal rallies that the Communists had planned and most of the gangs from East Germany were turned back at the border. Bus loads of "athletes" heading for games somewhere in Western Germany were especially common on September 30, but they had to turn around and go home. The East zone authorities retaliated by blockading the highway to Berlin for a day. The Peace Day program did not turn out a resounding success.

In Hamburg, for instance, the Communists gathered in small groups in private houses or side streets. At zero hour, all at once about 2,500 or 3,000 of them came out, well supplied with rocks and with bared teeth, and started to march. The police did not use guns or clubs but relied only on their fists. They broke up the mob, and afterwards dispersed several smaller gatherings. No lives were lost, though many of the police were bitten and a few had broken bones.

Most of the 113 rioters who were locked up had forged papers and had probably come from the East zone. In some ways the Hamburg gathering might be considered by the Communists as a good riot, especially in the planning by which a march was started before the police could interfere.

COMMUNIST POETRY

There was a small riot in Dortmund on August 20 that serves to show how a demonstration can be made over into a work of art by a communist newspaper reporter. About 200 FDJ boys and 100 sympathizers

set out to parade, with uniforms and banners. The government had forbidden this demonstration, so the police told the marchers to break it up and go home. Nine policemen were injured in a riot at this point, after which the marchers proceeded to the jail and demanded release of eight Communists who had been locked up the night before for sticking posters. The police then decided to use their clubs and the meeting was dispersed.

The story of this affair in the communist newspaper starts with a touching picture of the peaceful sunny day, the birds singing, small white clouds drifting across the sky. "Brave youth is on the march this morning, in the cause of peace, in defiance of the illegal order of the quisling government controlled by the American imperialists. A police captain stands in the way, but as youth marches on he turns and flees in terror. Collecting more policemen he turns again and makes a stand. Youth marches on. He orders his men to use their clubs, but as they raise their weapons a girl calls out, 'We are Germans, too,' and conscience stays their hands. But one of the police, No. 273, a brute whom conscience cannot move, cries, 'Get that girl, she is one of the worst,' and begins to lay about him with his club. Mounted police arrive and ride mercilessly into the crowd. The bystanders are shocked and take the part of the young peace fighters. The police are routed. The parade continues to the jail where the police, now thoroughly cowed, release the prisoners who had been unjustly held."

The lesson for the aspiring young Communist reading this report is that he can terrify the police by standing his ground; and that small numbers need not discourage him from starting a riot because the spectators will join in to help. The note of civil war is struck: "Here is German against German all because the foreign imperialists have ordered their quislings to suppress the peaceful aspirations of German youth." This is a propaganda backfire against the accusation that the FDJ itself is under foreign control. Finally, the police are given notice that the party has the number of any policeman who hits a Communist, and will remember him when The Day comes.

DEMAND FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

The propaganda treatment of the Peace Day program was largely defensive. The Soviets complained loudly about the persecution of patriots, and demanded freedom for "peace fighters." They reported a "sabotage conference" called by U. S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy at which plans were discussed for using Nazi suppression techniques on Communists, Socialists, and the FDJ. Actually, we prefer to leave the suppression of disorder to the German authorities. No one but the Soviets would benefit from stories of action by Allied forces.

The hypocrisy of the communist cries for freedom should not be taken to indicate any lack of intelligence

in the Soviet line. Western peoples are confused about the difference between a sound program for protection against communist activities and the extremist forms of suppression that play into communist hands. The Soviets cleverly stir up this confusion at every opportunity.

While they were protesting at the persecution of Communists in West Germany, the authorities of East Germany were in real trouble with an infiltration of Jehovah's Witnesses, burning to preach freedom in the teeth of all authority. Rewards were offered for information leading to the capture of the leaders of this dangerous movement.

In Western Germany the tendency has been to meet the rising tide of communist violence with measures of suppression, prohibition of outdoor demonstrations, seizure of literature, flags, and uniforms sent in from the East, and stopping of large groups who offer to cross the border as musicians or athletes on the way to a festival. Much of the police action forestalls the Communists from creating an occasion for a riot. When the Communists manage to start a riot, the police usually manage to hold it to a small affair with no great propaganda value.

For example, when President Heuss spoke at a meeting of miners at Bochum, September 24, the local FDJ and other communist miners tried to break up the meeting. The majority of the miners, however, turned to and helped the police suppress the hecklers. The police had captured about 300 young men from

Eastern Germany on their way to this meeting and put them back across the border. This band carried nearly $5,000 worth of marks and a large supply of gasoline coupons, which were confiscated. The union, on the day after the disturbance, fired several communist officials who had taken part in the heckling.

There is no question that rioting is valuable to the Communists for building morale in their own ranks and attracting certain types of young people. Most of the German young people have not, however, been

Noncommunist young people meet to discuss current affairs in forum sponsored by Americans.

drawn into the FDJ. The West German labor unions do not like the rioters and are not persuaded to join the Communists as a result of seeing demonstrations. The riots have not been on a scale that would terrify the population generally. Although there are many signs of fear among certain classes of Germans, the fear comes from other kinds of pressure rather than from the FDJ's show of force.

THE ELECTION OF OCTOBER 15, 1950

THE Soviet authorities in East Germany evidently decided that their puppet government needed to be made "legitimate" by an election. On October 15, 1950, therefore, the people were called upon to choose a new parliament. The Communist Party was ordered to win this election, and it succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of any American political party. The vote was slightly over 99.7 percent in favor of

October 15, West Germans light fires along border to show their sympathy with East Germans during "free" elections in Russian zone.

the National Front (the communist ticket). And more than 98 percent of the eligible voters voted. The West German press was quick to point out that so incredible a result was unskillful propaganda, since it could only arouse ridicule.

The report of the East German Communist Party convention in July had been entirely frank in deploring the lack of unanimous support among various classes of East Germans. Under "Shortcomings in the Cultural Sphere" it said: "Many of the intellectuals have not yet realized that the reconstruction of a progressive German culture can be achieved only by a perpetual struggle against all reactionary trends—against the theories of cosmopolitanism which is directed against the interests of the people, against the theories of bourgeois objectivism and against the American barbarism of culture." Under "Party Development" we find: "The struggle against Social Democratism and sectarianism will be effective only if it is simultaneously waged against all liberal and conciliatory tendencies which are nothing but spawning grounds for opportunists."

All this weird language means an admission that orthodox Leninist-Stalinist communism is endangered by liberals who still survive in more or less influential positions, and who must be liquidated When it came to the election in October, however, the leaders decided to go all out for making it look unanimous. The party workers were told to get out the vote and watch the voters.

As a precaution public counting of the votes was forbidden, because in the previous election of May 15–16, 1949, the Communists had been embarrassed by thousands of negative ballots, many of them carrying insulting remarks. The precaution was hardly needed, for this time it was practically suicide for the voter to write "No" or anything else on his ballot.

The system worked to perfection. Doorbell ringing was organized with an effect never approached by American party machines. Party workers explained that any voter who went fishing on election day must be an enemy of peace and unity, a polite phrase for "candidate for slave camp."

Hans Warnke, Communist labor leader, sounded the keynote of the campaign, announcing that groups of voters all over the country were "planning to march together to the polls." He pointed out the fact that all those who voted would be properly checked off the voters' lists. This announcement was actually a directive to the communist workers in each village, to muster the whole population, count noses, and march the people to the polls, allowing none to escape. That is exactly what happened in hundreds of villages all over the country.

The underground leaders agreed with Herr Warnke that this system was unbreakable and advised their members to avoid disclosure by going along.

The ballot was "secret" in a peculiarly totalitarian way. Only one list of candidates was printed on the ballots, and no marking was necessary to vote the

straight ticket. There were booths, however, where a voter could secretly mark his ballot if he wished to do so. In this connection Warnke proclaimed that any voter has the "fundamental democratic right" to stay out of the booth and vote openly by depositing his ballot unmarked; and he was glad to report that many groups of voters were pledging themselves to take advantage of this chance to show their colors. The radio announcements made it plain that anyone who went in a booth was marking himself an "enemy of peace." And there were communist watchers there to mark down the names of enemies.

French and Italian journalists, party not specified, were quoted as saying that "no one could deny" that the balloting in this election was free and secret. Various tame voters were brought to the microphone to testify that this was a free and secret ballot. The Moscow radio grew almost tearful in its congratulations to the East Germans on their "passionate unanimity," painting a touching picture of mothers with babes in their arms coming out to vote for peace. The Soviets evidently recognize the great moral pressure of the world on the side of honest elections, even when they are cynically violating every principle of an honest ballot.

IRREVERENCE FOR STALIN

There were one or two sour notes in the lovefeast of October 15. One was an order to the National

Front to guard the streets against people who were evidently not unanimous and were plastering walls at night with anti-communist stickers. Either the authorities were hysterically nervous, or the 0.3 percent who voted "No" may be taken as an underestimate of actual popular opposition to the party in power. But the worst blows came from the irrepressible Berliners.

East Berlin was not included in the election, but someone invented the bright idea of getting an opinion poll. The West Berlin government suggested that any East Berliner who felt dissatisfied with the election might express his feelings by sending in the stub of his September ration card. After the election the Mayor of West Berlin announced that he had received 375,712 of these anti-communist straw votes, plus 70,000 letters and miscellaneous tokens intended to express the same idea. Because of difficulty with the mail, East Germans outside Berlin could not be expected to send in stubs; but the vote represented over half the population of the Soviet sector of the city.

The Soviets reacted by announcing an extra ration of stockings, to be given only in exchange for the September ration stub, but even a pair of stockings evidently could not outweigh the pleasure of expressing an opinion about the Soviet rule.

SIGN OF THE TIMES

The newspapers of West Berlin joyfully contributed to the confusion of the campaign by setting up on

October 10 a large electric news sign like the one used by the New York *Times* and other papers in American cities. This sign was set on our side of Potsdamer Platz, facing toward East Berlin, where crowds could easily collect on the Soviet side of the boundary to read the news, and West Berliners could stand on their own side to watch the effect.

The Soviet authorities did not enjoy this development at all. They tried playing a firehose on the sign, but it turned out to be weatherproof. They brought a sound truck to shout "Americans, go home" at it, but the large crowd of delighted East Berliners could still read. They sent Young Communist boys to pass out leaflets, and hundreds of East Berliners were seen to collect the leaflets and make a bonfire of them. Later, the authorities built a large sign of their own to block the view, but it turned out to be too small. They then hung up a large canvas screen, and the West Berliners seized the chance to throw anti-Soviet movies on the canvas. The whole episode was bad for Soviet "face."

Since a religion such as communism is necessarily absolutely solemn, its face is easily damaged by any kind of ridicule, an art at which Berliners are experts. One wise precaution of the Soviet authorities, after sad experience, was an order that no "peace" meetings be held near the border for fear that someone would shoot rockets full of irreverent anti-communist leaflets into the meeting, which would then degenerate into an unseemly scramble for the contraband.



East Berlin workmen labor to complete giant news sign (background) to combat the sign already put up by West Berlin (foreground).

The election certainly did not make the East Germans believe in their own unanimous support of their government, nor in the secrecy and freedom of the election. It undeniably gave the people of Berlin a chance to exercise their wry sense of humor, which was enjoyed by all except the Communists. No one in Western Germany, outside the small Communist Party, believed that the 99.7 percent vote represented the feelings of their compatriots in the East. But the election did serve to prove that East Germany is under control. It may well have helped to maintain the fear that so many West Germans have when they look eastward.

Two weeks after the election Walter Ulbricht, Communist Vice Premier of East Germany, took a new line. He denied that a one-party system would be introduced in the People's Democratic Republic and promised that the bourgeois parties would be as well represented in the new government as in the old one. Passionate unanimity had evidently not met with as ready a sale as expected.

PRAGUE CONFERENCE AND PEACE LAW

ON October 21, 1950, Mr. Molotov met with representatives of the satellite states in Prague to consider plans for Germany. The plan adopted by the conference was no doubt prefabricated in Moscow. The conference proposed that the Western Powers consent to a preliminary convention of East and West Germans, in equal numbers, to set up nation-wide election machinery. Since only one-third of the Germans are in the Soviet zone, this was a cool suggestion of "even Stephen, one horse one rabbit." Further, the conference suggested that upon the establishment of a "democratic" government for all Germany, the Powers should make peace with the unified nation and withdraw all Occupation forces. This would, of course, leave a unified Germany with no military forces except about 50,000 German Communist police, officered largely by ex-Nazis, that are now in the Eastern zone. There would also be, of course, the Red Army about 60 miles from Berlin, on the Polish border. The Prague proposals did not point out the additional fact that Soviet propaganda at the time of the election of October 15 was violently critical of the Western system of dividing the nation by allowing opposition parties. A "democratic" government

in the Russian language is, of course, a one-party affair.

No doubt the Prague conference was partly aimed at the longing for national unity and peace, which in face of all the facts of life under the Soviets still grips the hearts of millions of Germans. As such it was merely a continuation of the East German propaganda line. Its chief aim, however, seems to have been to confuse and weaken the new drive for European defense which was stimulated by the Korean war. Soviet policy after the communist defeat at Inchon was to talk sweetness and light in the United Nations and, if possible, put the West to sleep again; Prague was related to this policy. However, the Soviet Berlin radio broke through the sugar coating and gloated over the "consternation" that had struck the Western Powers when they saw these new proposals for peace. West German opposition to rearmament would be stimulated, and the resistance to "warmongering" in France would be strengthened. This outburst no doubt betrays the main purpose of the whole maneuver, and it may have had enough success to pay the expenses of the Prague meeting. Later events in Korea helped the Soviet effort to bolster the stock of those in West Germany who were reluctant to see the Germans rearm.

PEACE LAW

On December 16, 1950, the East German "law for safeguarding peace" went into effect. This law

states in effect that anyone in Germany who opposes the Communists or even fails to cooperate with the Communist Party is a criminal. The law specifically states that West Germans are bound by it.

Those who understand the Soviet plan of conquest and oppose it know well enough that, law or no law, our necks are forfeit if the Soviets ever catch us. This pamphlet, for instance, is a criminal offense under a Soviet government, and anyone who can be proved to have read it will be punished if the Soviets should get control of the United States. The purpose of the East German law is to point out this danger to people who may not have thought of it as applying to themselves.

West Germans know that Soviet conquest of all Germany is not impossible. They now know that, if the Soviets take Western Germany, there will be a thorough purge of those who resisted in any way.

The East German puppet government claims to be the real government of all Germany, and it makes laws that claim to be binding on all Germans. The "peace law" lays penalties, from fines to sentence of death, on any German, East or West, who engages in "war propaganda" or "agitates against the peace movement." This is communist gobbledygook for opposition to Soviet control. The law spells it out.

The crimes include "recruiting Germans for the French Foreign Legion or other similar foreign military formations, and propaganda for the inclusion of Germany in an aggressive military bloc." This of

course means taking any part in West European defense.

"Glorification of atom weapons or scorning the peace movement" will also be punished. This means refusing to sign the fraudulent "peace pledge" that was started at a communist "peace conference" in Stockholm and has been widely circulated in the free countries.

"Persecution of peace-fighters" is also a crime. This means any interference with communist newspapers, poster-sticking, marching, or riots.

Doing anything ordered by the West German Government or the Occupying Powers is a crime.

Visiting an American library, listening to the Voice of America, and seeing American movies are, of course, crimes.

In a word, it is a crime not to be a good Communist and work for Stalin. This is no joke for people who live next door to the Red Army. Even if the Red Army does not march, it is the duty of local Communists, or of agents from behind the Curtain, to kidnap the "criminals" in West Germany and take them to the Eastern zone for trial. Kidnaping has been fairly common in West Berlin; this law makes it official for Germany as a whole, if the Communists can get away with it.

The law does not actually change the situation of democratic Germans who may be caught by Soviet agents. It is a propaganda device, to make the fear of Stalin more visible, and especially to intimidate

anyone who might be inclined to cooperate with West European defense.

The "peace law" contradicts the conciliatory language of the Prague conference proposals. Soviet propaganda is often contradictory, since its purpose often is merely to cause confusion. In this case, however, it is possible that the change in tone from October 21 to December 16 represents a change in feeling after the Chinese victories in Korea.

East Berlin police kidnap news photographer from West Berlin.

BUILDING STRENGTH AGAINST COMMUNISM

THE center of Allied resistance to communism in Germany is in the field of the spirit; all the economic and military moves have to be planned with due respect for the progress of the German spirit. Economic recovery cannot succeed if Germans have no heart to work or if communist agents can needle them to strike for mere disorder instead of for the natural purpose of getting better pay and working conditions. German help in the military defense of the West cannot succeed if the German people do not care whether the Communists take them over or not.

Success depends on developing a spirit of courage, hope, and love of democratic liberty, in a people who have only recently been crushed by defeat and disillusioned by the collapse of Hitler's insane dream. That is why one of the largest sections of the American High Commissioner's office in Germany is the section that handles information and education. That is why the policies of the whole organization are planned, as far as possible, with a view to building the institutions and the spirit of democracy.

In the long run the best policy in any country is to set up conditions that will make the people practically *immune* to Soviet propaganda and subversion. The same healthy conditions will also make the Germans want to avoid a revival of nazism. If we can make Germany strongly democratic, the fact that Communists cannot be kept out, and that the Soviet radio still blares over the ether, will not be important.

The best reason for building health is that health is good in itself, not merely to escape disease. Our main job, therefore, is positive and constructive; defense against communism is only one of many benefits that will come with success.

OPPOSING COMMUNISM

In the short run, we also have to do some negative or merely sanitary work in cleaning up Soviet lies and efforts at sabotage. But most of the Soviet propaganda, such as the story of the October 15 election, is well understood by the Germans themselves. The free newspapers in the Western zones make the necessary comments without having to be told what to say.

Negative propaganda against the Communists consists largely of satire, which is always dangerous to a dictatorship. RIAS, the powerful American radio voice in West Berlin, is an island of disconcerting information behind the Iron Curtain. RIAS is the most powerful station in Central Europe and is on the air 20 ½ hours a day. It blankets the entire Communist-



controlled area of Germany and is widely listened to by the East Germans in spite of heavy penalties imposed on those who are caught.

Locally, the West Berliners need no instruction in the art of ridicule which they turn loose at every opportunity across the line into the Soviet sector, where it is taken up by thousands of anti-communist East Berliners. These operations do not reduce the size of the Red Army or of the militarized police force of East Germany, but they contribute vastly to raising the hope and courage of Western Germans. They seriously undermine the morale and loyalty of the East German police, and even of the Red Army officers.

The Fighting Group Against Inhumanity, with headquarters in West Berlin, is one of several independent organizations operating in East Germany to

undermine the Soviet influence. The Fighting Group reports on the fate of East Germans who are spirited away by the secret police and broadcasts the names of informers, for the protection of East Germans who are still outside the slave camps. The effect of this work embarrasses the Soviet authorities in the East and helps to keep the West Germans alive to the more ghastly features of life under communist rule. These organizations are native products, not set up by the Occupation, and are therefore all the more potent against the Soviets.

BUILDING DEMOCRACY

The positive side of Allied work for democracy consists of a wide range of information and training, and the constant use of influence to stimulate democratic practices.

The directive of the U. S. High Commissioner lays down the line of what results we want to work for:

We want to increase respect for individual dignity and rights, respect for the opinions of others and of minorities, freedom of thought and speech, and liberal social attitudes in general.

We want to promote representative and responsible self-government, justice based on a free search for truth, personal responsibility for public affairs, and recognition that officials are servants, not masters of the public.

We want legal and social rights for all, regardless of race, sex, or creed.

We want increased respect for international peace and cooperation, and for the idea of German culture as an integral part of Western civilization.

Our representatives of course have to recognize that no one can make a foreign population follow any such list of rules merely by posting them on the wall and preaching about how desirable they are. All people have their own habits and prejudices, including a natural dislike of being told by foreigners how to be good and happy. We try to create conditions that will influence the people to make up their own minds out of their own experience, and in their own time.

One such condition is an improved supply of truthful information, which is spread by radio, by a U. S. daily newspaper, and by magazines and moving pictures.

The Germans are given truthful news, both good and bad. They have had long experience of doctored news under Mr. Goebbels. They are quite well able to recognize dishonest reporting and to appreciate the truth. The Soviets may gain an advantage by pegging a big lie to a small scrap of truth, since their chief end is to make trouble. But the Western authorities want to build real understanding. We can afford the slow process of establishing a reputation for sticking to the truth.

Much of the educational material for the adult

population is made up of magazines, books, and documentary movies that describe life in the free countries and offer technical information on industry and agriculture. A large part of what we aim to do is merely to bring the Germans back into touch with Western civilization after the long Nazi blackout. We want them to feel familiar with Western ways, some of which they may want to copy, and all of which they need to understand.

REFORMING THE SCHOOLS

In the German school system, our first job was largely negative, to clear away the rubbish. Nazi textbooks had to be scrapped as soon as possible, a slow job, since new school texts had to be written and printed. Teachers who were incurable Nazis had to be screened out.

The State Ministers of Education were persuaded to set up committees of German educators to revise the schoolbooks. We helped by supplying new source materials, which of course were lacking in Germany after 12 years of Nazi rule. The new books began coming off the press in quantity in 1950.

In 1948, many of the German leaders in the American zone organized forums on the purposes of education, and these were highly successful. Hundreds of meetings were held, with Germans presiding. American educational experts were usually present

to make suggestions. Large numbers of private citizens attended these meetings, and the discussions were free and wide-ranging, much like similar discussions in the United States. The forums themselves were a good lesson in democracy.

The second stage, in which the Americans acted as tutors for Germans willing to cooperate but unfamiliar with the methods of democratic action, has been drawing to a close. The third stage, of cultural cooperation on an equal basis with Germans managing their own affairs, is now established in most of the lines of democratic activity. From here on, the

Discussion in a teachers training school, Hesse.

Germans, like any other democratic people, must learn by making their own mistakes.

The reform of their school system is only one instance of the three stages of progress that have characterized most of our relations with the Germans. There are many other encouraging developments, such as the growth of parent-teacher associations, civil-liberties groups, women's organizations, and town-hall meetings.

The school reforms that we wanted to see in Germany could not have been imposed by force, since nothing is easier to sabotage than a school system which the teachers do not accept. The Soviets have a temporary advantage in their zone, since their crude type of schooling can be imposed by force, to the extent that they can find loyal Communists to put in as teachers. The teacher of a communist school need not be a good teacher, and everything is in the book. But the Soviet schools are still open to sabotage, and they suffer from the fact that parents usually do their best to counteract the teaching. Our method is slower, but progress when it comes is, we hope, more likely to be real.

VISITING AMERICA

One of the most effective kinds of educational work is the exchange program, which brings Germans to the United States to study. We are bringing not only

secondary-school and college students, but also men who are already in position to influence the present course of government and business. As many Americans know, groups of German civil servants, members of the legislature, lawyers, and businessmen are constantly in this country. Their trips are managed so as to bring them in touch with American experts and leaders, who can answer some of their questions. It is not expected that Germans will adopt every method they observe in the United States, but the exchange program is effective in relaxing prejudices and stimulating ideas that the visitors can use at home. This program is far more effective for Germany, or any other country, than mere lectures by Americans on how the foreigner ought to behave. Each country has to digest what it finds in other countries and turn it into a native form before any lessons learned from outsiders can be useful.

LAUNCHING THE GOVERNMENT

In government, the Allied policy has been to let the Germans operate the forms of democracy as well as they can, superintended by the High Commissioners to see that they do not try anything that will be dangerous to the Occupying Powers. Where it seemed advisable they have sometimes been nudged in the direction of democratic processes.

The Germans in the Western zones were started off at first in local governments, then the State govern-

ments or *Laender* were set up, and finally the Federal Government. The State and local governments were at first appointed in the summer of 1945. Political parties were authorized in November 1945, and by early 1946 elections were held, first in villages, then in cities and counties, and finally in States. These elections have given a chance for practice in democratic methods and for learning by experience and mistakes. It is a slow process. The machinery creaks and often is taken over by a strong leader, as sometimes happens in well-established democracies. But the American observers are encouraged when some humble citizen rises in meeting and criticizes the government. When he finds he is not rushed off to a concentration camp, others are encouraged to start having free opinions of their own.

General Clay introduced the custom of press conferences, which have had a good educational effect. German newspapermen, after seeing how American representatives of the press did not hesitate to ask searching questions, plucked up courage to question American and German officials. The German press soon began to adopt a healthy habit of condemning officials who refuse to submit to questioning. This is a new and potent feature of German life and presents a strong contrast to communist practices.

The Federal Government is farther removed from village meetings than the local governments and is perhaps more likely to forget that it is the servant of the voter. As might be expected, the Federal

Government quickly got into troubles like those sometimes found in older democratic countries, one crisis growing out of accusations of bribery and another out of charges of arbitrary usurpation of power. The educational effect of these crises should not be overlooked.

LEARNING DEMOCRATIC METHODS

The main purpose of our attempts to educate or influence the Germans is not to get perfect actions from the officials, but to get the people to the point where they can run a democracy on their own. No country can run a democracy with no mistakes at all, but we hope to get a German nation that runs reasonably well and is responsible enough to join the society of free nations. Books and discussions by Americans are valuable. But we cannot expect to teach the Germans democracy out of books alone, or by having them hear Americans lecture on how to avoid graft and how to keep the chief executive from acting like a dictator. What little any democratic country knows about solving these problems must be learned by experience, as we can testify after nearly a thousand years of experience in England and America.

The charges that certain business interests had bribed legislators to vote for locating the Federal Government at Bonn set off a nation-wide argument. The newspapers made it clear that bribery is not safe in present-day Germany, as it was for the insiders

of Hitler's government. The Germans also had a chance to note the unholy joy of the Soviet propaganda artists, who pounded day after day on the corruption of the hated West German Government.

No democracy can be guaranteed against graft, but this sort of experience has a tendency to give the people a healthy sense of keeping an eye on their officials.

In the same way, the resignation of a cabinet member who accused Chancellor Adenauer of usurping power was of educational value to the Germans of all parties. One of the toughest problems in German democracy is the old habit of authority and submission to authority. This cabinet crisis has given the citizens a chance to see their Chancellor accused of taking too much authority, of disregarding his cabinet, and of bypassing the legislature. Mr. Adenauer felt called upon to reply in a radio speech, in which he did not, like Hitler, call the legislature "the greatest babbling institution of all time." On the contrary, the head of the state denied that he was taking arbitrary power, and assured the people that he would respect the constitutional rights of the legislature.

Accusations and denials of this kind are common in democratic countries and are a healthy sign. In Germany the whole question was aired in the newspapers while the Soviet radio howled as if arbitrary power were something the happy communist countries never have to fear. The most important point is not who was right or who was lying, but that the German people

had a good exercise in talking against authoritarian methods in government. We could never by preaching cure the conservative Germans of their traditional love of authority. But if they are ever cured of the theory that arbitrary authority is the best way of government, it will be by talking themselves out of it in the course of political controversy.

The American policy in German controversies, especially between officials and the people, has been to refuse to settle anything by giving orders. Instead, we encourage the parties to fight it out. By such fights the people get the idea that they are responsible for making their officials toe the line, or else electing new ones. The officials gradually learn that they are public servants.

There have been a number of cases where officials arbitrarily made decisions that roused criticism among the people. When representatives of the people asked the Americans to overrule a bad decision, they were told to get up meetings and muster the opposition. Sometimes the official decided to back down. In a few cases he had to be pushed a bit by the Americans. Sometimes he was put out of office in the next election.

The fact that the Occupying Powers have the final authority on many questions is itself an advantage in training the Germans to handle their own affairs. The old German habit of expecting the rulers to settle all questions is undermined when they look to the Powers for a decision and are told instead that it is for the

people to decide. It is especially important that the people decide political disputes that do not involve any official misconduct. There have been gratifying signs of public opinion being mobilized for normal political controversy. A great advance was the action of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in deciding to negotiate with the German Government on the subject of rearmament, instead of simply giving orders.

The habits of authority and submission are still strong in Germany. The political parties are strongly centralized and strictly disciplined. But it is usually true that political parties in a parliamentary system are more tightly organized than in the American system, because of the chance that the Government may be overthrown by losing a vote of confidence. The Americans who have worked in Germany recently believe that, among the middle and working classes, the habits of authority are melting away, as the people begin to feel more confidence in the practical stability of democratic forms of government.

CONSERVATIVES AND SOCIALISTS

German progress in democracy has to depend on the two middle-ground elements in German political life, which together make up at present a majority of the voters. These are the socialists and the conservatives, roughly equivalent to the workers and the business and professional classes. Allied anti-communist policy is reinforced by the hold of the socialists on

labor and the hold of a liberal, pro-Western brand of conservatism on the middle class. In understanding these elements, we Americans are hampered by our own long-distance views of both parties, on one hand the American dislike of socialism, and, on the other, our well-founded belief that the German business and professional classes were loyal supporters of aggression under both the Kaiser and the Führer.

The Germans and the Soviets are well aware that the Socialist Party is the solid enemy of communism. It is socialism that holds the workers away from the Communist Party. For its continued success, the Socialist Party, with the labor unions, must be able to deliver at least the two main requirements of labor, steadily increasing employment and rising wages. These requirements may call for larger public-works expenditures, especially for housing, and more rapid expansion of industry by either private or public investment. Pressure on some industries that are slow to raise wages may be necessary, but the normal use of strikes may be preferable to government decrees for this purpose.

Prejudice on our side cannot safely be allowed to interfere with developments that are necessary to keep the workers safely in the socialist camp. In Germany there is nowhere else for them to be except in some revolutionary movement, nazi or communist.

Many Germans make a distinction between those whom they call "decent people" and "Nazi swine." Under Hitler control, practically everyone who earned

his living had to collaborate in some way with the Nazis. Some enjoyed it, others did not. Some went out of their way to act like wild beasts; others did their jobs quietly and kept their heads down.

Most of the "decent people" are capable of becoming permanently "Western" in their politics. Even the most violent anti-Nazis believe that success will depend on bringing into camp the conservatives who have, to be sure, a past history of cooperating with aggressors, but who are not hopelessly anti-Western. For, if we insist on regarding all who went along with Hitler as permanent enemies, only a minority of the German electorate can be our friends; and large numbers of conservatives, once alienated, are capable of allying themselves with the Communists, as they did in 1939.

The present moderate-conservative majority, led by Chancellor Adenauer, is prepared to work reasonably with the free nations of Western Europe. But its hold on the middle-class voters may depend on certain political attitudes that the Occupying Powers do not like. Its economic policies are often too conservative to meet the necessities of rapid recovery. A successful policy will depend on encouraging the conservative party to relax the outworn attitudes that would block recovery, full employment and defense, while helping so far as possible to strengthen the hold of decent conservatism in the middle class as against a revival of nazism.

It is clear that the Allied objective in Germany, to bring the German people and their government into

firm alliance with Western Europe, can be gained only by starting from the political and economic features that are now there. We cannot and should not try to make the Germans into Americans nor even into the exact kinds of Germans that we should prefer to see. But there are elements in German life that, if allowed to flourish, will bring Germany into the Western family. Communist propaganda is aimed at weakening these more or less pro-Western elements, and, wherever possible, at arousing Allied prejudice and irritation against them. Here, as everywhere, our success depends on playing our own game with realism, and not being led into thoughtless actions that help our enemies.

PROMOTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The economic recovery of Germany has of course been a strong factor in strengthening the country against nazi and communist temptations. The Marshall Plan has supplied materials to get industry going again and to give agriculture a start with machinery, animals, seed, and fertilizer. Production by 1950 was a little above prewar, though that is not enough to give the people a decent standard of living because of the large number of refugees to be supported. But the majority of Germans can now eat regularly, and that is a great help to morale and a blow to communist agitators. Much more progress is needed along the line of giving full employment and letting those who

are on relief start earning a living, but conditions are better than might have been expected.

All the usual problems of a free business system, from wage rates to monopoly, are found in Western Germany, and the best answers are not always clear. Monopoly, in particular, is not regarded by Europeans with the disfavor that it finds under American anti-trust laws, and attempts to reduce cartels and monopoly practices have only a limited success. But the effect of operating business concerns and labor unions, free of the control of a dictator, is educational, at least in the sense of getting the Germans used to the Western way of industrial life.

COMPETING IDEALS

One point that may be helpful in counteracting Soviet propaganda for a reunited Germany is the appeal of a united Europe. American policy favors European union on the ground that we have found union to be strength. We have hopes that a strong Europe can stand on its own feet in both business and defense without constant subsidy from America. But the main question in Europe is whether European Union has an emotional appeal as our Union had for us when we emerged, poor but victorious, out of the American Revolution. Nations and Federal Unions are not born unless the people feel the drive of a high adventure to overcome the many small selfish interests that always stand in the way of united action.

Many Western Germans, especially young Germans, as they grow used to the hopelessness of a united Germany with the Soviets standing in the way, are beginning to see in Western Europe a national ideal in which they could take pride of membership and play a respected part. Their broken piece of Germany seems too small for them. The Soviet offer of German union is tainted by the knowledge that such a union as the Soviets would allow would be a slave state. They had once believed Europe could be united under German control, but, for the present at least, this dream has been knocked out of them with bombs. Now they appear to be dreaming of belonging to a United Europe big enough to be economically sound and militarily strong. If we can encourage this dream, we may hope that the idealistic side of the German soul may line itself up with civilization at last, instead of returning to the childish dreams of world conquest that have driven it insane in the past.

The Soviets on their side play strongly on the idealistic themes of communist "democracy" and freedom from capitalist oppression. In theory, and in the years when the Soviet revolution was engaged in overthrowing the tyranny of the Tsars, this doctrine appealed to many idealists in Western Europe. But the gilt is off the romance of communism, now that the real nature of Soviet tyranny is clear, and those who are close to the Iron Curtain know best of all how communist "democracy" looks to its victims. In a contest for the hearts of the Germans, Hitler is very dead, the Soviets

have a disgusting odor, and it is up to the Western Allies to set up a new union of free nations that will win their allegiance.

Once married to Western Europe, Germany will of course find the usual questions coming up. Who is going to dominate whom? What interests must give way to hold the union together? How can conflicting standards of value be reconciled? These inevitable problems are no reason for despair. The United States has had them all and still has them; they are standard political questions in any free country. Our policy in Europe includes such persuasion as we can bring to bear to convince all parties that union is worth the price. That is the main line in our present efforts to help the Germans build a healthy democracy at home and a friendly relationship with their free neighbors. The job is a long and complicated one, but there are encouraging signs of progress. If the general health of Germany can be strengthened, the danger of a return of nazism, or of serious effects from communist influence, will gradually disappear.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : O—1951